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Abstract 
Venture capital (literally “high–risk capital”) is designated for the 
financing of small companies that by themselves lack sufficient resources, but 
whose activities indicate potentially high profits in the future. It can play  
a special role in the development of the technologically advanced industries as 
well as in the growth of entrepreneurship understood as a readiness to establish 
new companies (“start–ups”). 
Two factors: First, the relatively small number of new companies as well 
as the number of companies subject to liquidation over the year (“firm 
turnover”) in Japan, and second, the insignificant prestige associated with the 
profession of entrepreneur do not foster growth in the dynamics of this form of 
financing ventures. The cited indicator for Japan in among the lowest in 
comparison with other highly developed countries1, while the profession of 
entrepreneur is not the foremost dream of college graduates. They would much 
rather prefer realizing their professional careers as members of the government 
bureaucracy or employees of a major corporation2. However, this mindset is 
slowly changing, if for no other reason then, in spite of popular conviction, 
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because most small companies are not established during periods of prosperity, 
but near the end of the downward phase of the economic cycle. That is exactly 
the phase Japan has been dealing with for several years now. Young, creative 
people, recruited from the unemployed, are seeking self–employment, using all 
possible opportunities embedded in the “again starting up” machinery of the 
economy3. 
1. Introduction 
Perhaps, in addition to the relatively low public opinion of the profession 
of entrepreneur and the low “inter–generational” replacement of companies 
(“firm turnover”), there are two other phenomena determining the relatively 
small—as compared with the United States and Europe—level of involvement in 
VC investment in Japan. These two factors are the generally disdainful attitude 
of the inhabitants of the Land of the Cherry Blossom with respect to risk and 
actual, functioning legal regulations that impede the emergence and operation of 
VC companies. Figure No. 1 depicts the level of investment outlay on high–risk 
ventures over the years 2005–2009 for the United States, Europe, and Japan. 
Figure 1. Venture capital investment in the United States, Europe, and Japan over the years 
2005–2009 (billion yen) 
Source: “2010 Survey Results on Trends in Venture Capital Investment,” Venture Enterprise 
Center, Japan, p. 3, http://www.vec.or.jp/download/125 
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 Yonekura S. and Lynskey M. (2003), “Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained,” paper presented 
at the Global Forum – Entrepreneurship in Asia: 4th U.S.–Japan Dialogue, April 16, 2003, 
available from the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, p. 11. 
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Analysis of data contained in Figure No. 1 indicates a falling trend in 
outlay in the case of Japan. An exception is the year 2006, when growth was 
noted. This is probably tied with the expansive monetary policy of that period 
and a short–term acceleration of the economy. The situation returned to normal 
following this “one–time incident” and the economy again plunged into 
recession. This was duly followed by a fall in VC investments. 
2. Characteristics of Venture Capital (VC) in Japan 
Figure No. 2 shows the shaping of high–risk capital expenditure in Japan 
in greater detail, including for the years 2002–2010—the first initial public 
offerings (IPOs) for Japanese high technology stock exchanges. Both indicators 
are seen to gradually grow over the 2002–2006 period following the breaking of 
the “Internet bubble” over the years 2000–2001. Starting with 2007, it is 
possible to note a successive drop in both. The dynamics of changes in VC 
investment is reflected in the fluctuations of the JASDAQ securities exchange 
index, where small and medium enterprises as well as VC companies are noted4. 
This is confirmed by the observation that the rate of IPO growth is, to a great 
extent, dependent on the state of the economy. It is relatively high during lively 
and blossoming phases and low during crisis and recession stages of the 
economy. 
                                                 
4
 Six security exchanges are currently functioning in Japan—Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Fukuoka, 
Sapporo, and JASDAQ. April 1, 2010 saw the merger of JASDAQ (including the segment of 
NEO–New Entrepreneurs’ Opportunity high technology companies) with HERCULES, which is  
a part of the Osaka exchange for new, innovative entities. JASDAQ, inclusive of the NIKKEI 
stock exchange index, remain the most renowned VC market. The others are MOTHERS, AIM, 
etc. 
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Figure 2. Venture capital investment in Japan over the years 2002–2010 (billion yen)  
Source: “2010 Survey Results on Trends in Venture Capital Investment,” Venture Enterprise 
Center, Japan, p. 2, http://www.vec.or.jp/download/125 
Figure No. 3 presents the number of initial public offerings financed using 
high–risk capital in Japan over the 1999–2009 period subdivided into concrete 
stock markets. 
Figure 3. Number of initial public offerings (IPOs) of companies supported by venture 
capital in Japan over the years 1999–2009  
Source: 12. OSE/JASDAQ merger’s significance and the future of Japan’s venture markets, NRI 
Financial Research Paper “lakyara,” Nomura Research Institute, vol. 78, p. 3. 
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T. Kirihata5 (2006) states that a lion’s share of VC investment went to the 
processing industry, followed by food and beverage wholesale and retail trading 
(Table No. 1). In the United States over the same period the breakdown of outlay 
achieved using the same method was ultimately different and preferred software 
and information processing, tele–information technologies, and medical 
products (Table No. 2). The enclosed data again confirm the premise regarding 
the leading role, including in chronological sequence, of the United States in 
initiating technological progress and investment. However, changes should be 
noted on the Japanese side. For example, VC investments in biotechnology 
increased from 3.7% (the whole of outlay in 1998) to 7.7% in 2008. In their turn, 
VC investment expenditures on health care grew from 1.5% to 9.4% over the 
same period6. 
                                                 
5
 Kirihata, T., “The Formation Process and Characteristics of the Japanese Venture Capital 
Industry,” Working Paper, No. 113, Kyoto University, February 2010, p. 6. 
6
 Research was conducted by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in 2002 and was 
subsequently repeated in 2008. 
 Table 1. VC investments in Japan (amounts and percentage shares) in billion yen in 1998 
 
Processing 
industry 
Food and 
beverage 
wholesale/ 
retail 
trade 
Other 
services Construction 
Finance 
and 
insurance 
Software 
Information 
processing/ 
Services 
Telecommunications 
Agriculture 
and forestry 
/ fishing / 
mining 
Levels of investment 
outlay (in absolute 
figures) 
240.9 105.8 99.1 41 38.6 3.23 9.0 2.2 1.9 
Levels of investment 
outlay(percentages) 42.2 18.5 17.4 7.2 6.8 5.7 1.6 0.4 0.3 
Source: Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (2000), p. 110, in T. Kirihata, “The Formation Process …,” op. cit., p. 6. 
Table 2. VC investments in the United States (in billion dollars) in 1998 
 
Software/ 
Information 
processing 
Telecommuni 
cations 
Medical 
products 
Wholesale/ 
retail 
trading 
Biotechnology 
Semiconductor 
manufacturing 
equipment 
Computers and 
elements tied 
with computer 
manufacturing 
Machine 
tools Other 
Levels of investment 
outlay (in absolute 
figures) 
5.7 2.8 2.3 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 1.8 
Levels of investment 
outlay (percentages) 34.4 17.0 13.7 7.1 6.2 5.0 3.4 2.3 9.2 
Source: Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (2000). p. 110. in T. Kirihata. “The Formation Process ….” op. cit.. p. 6. 
                                                            Venture Capital in Japan...                                                  37 
 
In their turn, Mayer et al. (2005) prove in their comparative study on VC 
investment in Japan, Germany, Israel, and Great Britain, based on Nikkei Kinyu 
(Financial Nikkei) data for sixty–two high–risk companies, that resources are 
primarily applied to the needs of the tele–information and software industry, 
with biotechnology, the life sciences, and environmental protection second. The 
authors contend that a relatively small share of outlay supporting the 
development of electronics and semiconductors as well as products and 
technologies from the processing industry (including chemicals) stems from the 
fact that most serious research and development work in Japan in this field is 
conducted in the laboratories of major companies of the “keiretsu”7. 
3. The Entity Criterion for VC Investment in Japan and Its Importance  
to Efficiency 
There are various sources of “venture capital” investment financing 
throughout the world. In the United States, the dominant role is played by the 
stock exchange and corporate investors as well as individuals—“angel 
investors.” Corporate investors are mainly recruited from among former 
executive or financial managers. Retirement funds (both state and private) are of 
significant importance in supplying high–risk financing, as are insurance 
companies. In Great Britain, the most frequently met sources are retirement 
funds, but also insurance companies as well as individual and government 
partners8. In economies where the financial system is based on banks (e.g. 
Germany and Japan), there can be an overwhelming preponderance of banks as 
the basic entity providing resources. This is the case in Germany. In Japan, it is 
the non–banking financial institutions that are of greatest importance (securities 
companies, credit card companies, leasing companies, and mortgage credit 
institutions), followed by banks and insurance companies. However, a large 
share of these is at least in part owned by banks. 
A specific feature of activities in the high technology industries is the long 
period of return and the related uncertainty as to the final results (what is known 
as the “novelty risk”). This means that, in general, individual and corporate 
investors are more inclined to allocate outlay in these fields as opposed to 
institutional investors (banks, retirement funds, and insurance companies). 
                                                 
7
 C. Mayer et al., “Sources of Funds and Investment Activities of Venture Capital Funds: 
Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan, the United Kingdom,” Journal of Corporate Finance, No. 
11, 2005, p. 593. 
8
 Ibid., p. 587. 
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However, if that is the case, “crafty” banks, including Japanese ones, try to tie 
the financing of small innovative companies with their own main objective, 
which is the quick multiplying of money (more on this topic below). 
The relatively small interest of banks in commercial credit for small hi–
tech companies is linked with their weaker (as compared with major 
corporations) position in terms of assets. This translates into creditworthiness. 
Moreover, although new ventures may be characterized by high development 
potential, the discussed entities usually do not have real estate of other forms of 
security for loans at their disposal. 
Although it is true that Japanese banks—when so requested by 
government financial institutions (Japan Development Bank)—agreed to accept 
intellectual property (brands and patent) as collateral (Yonekura and Lynskey, 
op. cit, p. 3), the precise assessment of its value and low asset liquidity are  
a significant barrier. After all, banks prefer security that, if necessary, can be 
sold almost at a moment’s notice. On the other hand, intangible assets (e.g. 
patents) are subject to quick “depreciation,” especially in cases of an absence of 
developed trading markets and the Japanese system of protection for inventors, 
which is not overly rigorous. Moreover, high technology companies generally 
demonstrate long periods of research and development before any new product 
or new implementation makes its appearance. 
In such a context, there is nothing strange in the fact that Japanese 
financial sector entities invest by way of specially created VC companies that 
are affiliated to them. There is also nothing strange in the concentration of outlay 
in later stages of project implementation9, just before the public debut of the new 
companies. This way, financial resources are frozen for a short period of time 
and support is given to companies whose success is “in the bag.” In the mean 
time, from the point of view of promotion of authentic progress, funds are 
necessary that will reward the risk, costs, and courage in the early stages of 
innovation (obviously after the presentation of a convincing business plan) at 
least in part. 
If one subdivides the entire period of operations into four phases—(1) 
Seed money, (2) The establishing of new VC companies (start–ups), (3) A one 
to five year period, and (4) A five to ten year period—the United States is in the 
forefront with respect to involvement in the first and second phases, while the 
                                                 
9
 Hellmann, T., Lindsey, L., and Puri, M., “Building Relationships Early: Banks in Venture 
Capital” (April 2008), Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 21, Issue 2, pp. 520–521, 2008. These 
observations apply to relations between banks and VC companies in the United States. They 
confirm the overall conclusion that in starting cooperation banks look to future profits—e.g. 
projections as to the possibility of granting credit. This principle is also in force in Japan (Kirihata, 
“The Formation Process …,” op. cit., pp. 8–9). 
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majority view in Japan is a “late appreciation” orientation. It is not without 
import that former bank officials hold seats on company boards. They, as 
claimed by Kuemmerle10 (1999), know how to assess the value of credit 
security, but lack sufficient general economic knowledge making possible the 
drafting of a good business plan or technical know–how that is prerequisite to 
the identification of promising advanced technology projects. 
Table No. 3 presents the ten largest VC investors in Japan in 2007. 
Analysis of the data found in the table indicates that they are indeed giants in the 
Japanese financial sector. Thus, in their 2009 order, SBI Holdings (1999) is 
derived from Softbank Investment, JAFCO – Japan Associated Finance Co. Ltd. 
(1973) is affiliated with the Nomura brokerage house, and Mizuho Capital 
(2002) is tied to the Mizuho financial group, or more specifically, the Mizuho 
Bank. The remaining companies have a similar pedigree: Chuo Mitsui Capital 
was a company established as a subordinate of the merged Mitsui Bank and 
Sumitomo Bank (2002), while NIF SMBC Ventures is closely connected to the 
Daiwa brokerage house. 
Table 3. Japan’s larges venture capital investors, 2007 
Venture Capital Investments (billion yen) 
SBI Holdings 1170 
Chuo Mitsiu Capital 769 
JAFCO 603 
NIF SMBC Venture 370 
Nikko Antfactory 239 
JAIC 227 
Mizuho Capital 90 
Tokyo Marine Capital 81 
ORIX Capital 80 
Mitsubishi UFJ Capital 79 
Source: M. Corver, op. cit., p. 4. 
The only entity in the table that is not an “extension” of the financial 
sector is JAIC – Japan Asia Investment Co. Ltd. (1981). It was founded with the 
mission of supporting innovative advanced technology projects. 
                                                 
10
 Kuemmerle W. (2001), “Comparing Catalysts of Change: Evolution and Institutional 
Differences in the Venture Capital Industries in the US, Japan and Germany,” Chapter 7, 
Comparative Studies of Technological Evolution, Research and Technological Innovation, 
Management and Policy, edited by. R. Burgelman and H. Chesbrough, Amsterdam and Oxford, 
Elsevier Science, vol. 7, p. 36. 
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According to the VC Fund Benchmark Report, there were eighty–five 
high–risk capital companies in Japan in fiscal year 2007. They managed 451 
funds (Corver 2008, p. 12). The average fund volume was approximately USD 
40 million (after conversion). Fund resources were, on average, supplied by ten 
partners—investors. 
The fact that it is primarily entities of the financial sector that are engaged 
in VC processes also finds its reflection in the characteristics of the methods 
used in withdrawing capital from the modern technology investment market 
(compare Figure No. 4). The most frequently applied form is the initial public 
offering (IPO). It is with the trading debut that the first profits make their 
appearance. These are consumed by the suppliers of funds. There are other 
methods that are less popular: debt write–off, company liquidation, stock 
repurchase by the investor, and the sale of the ennobled entity. It should be 
added that the last form is used particularly often in the United States, the 
country of origin of VC, because it is at that moment the investors in stock 
receive cumulative profits. In analyzing the data in the figure in detail it is 
possible to notice the falling number of IPOs (both in terms of relative volumes 
and absolute values). This may point to a growing role of other methods for 
withdrawing capital. It may also be the result of over ten years of recession in 
Japan. 
The priority assigned to the IPO generally stems from the fact that 
financing by way of high–risk capital conducted by entities that have ownership 
ties with the banking sector and securities institutions remains in agreement with 
the goals of that segment of the economy—i.e. maximizing quick cash turnover. 
Thus, the mission behind these actions is not innovation and diffusion, care for 
the development of the co–created company, or the sale of patents and products 
for industry, but primarily the multiplying of profits. 
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Figure 4. Methods of withdrawing VC over the year 2003–2008  
Source: Venture Business Review in Japan, 2008–2009, Venture Enterprise Center, Japan, p. 2, 
http://www.vec.or.jp/download/114 
4. Legal Solutions in the Area of Financing High–Risk Capital 
The first private VC company in Japan was established in 1972. Kyoto 
Enterprise Development, a “daughter” company of Kyoto Association of 
Corporate Executives, was created on the basis of American models (Kirihata 
2010, p. 3). Its operations concentrated on support for the development of high 
technology small and medium enterprises in the Kyoto region. It made 
investments valued at approximately JPY 300 million in forty–two local 
corporations, financial institutions, and other entities listed on the Kyoto stock 
exchange over the eight years of its existence. Most probably, one of the major 
reasons for its liquidation was organizational excess when compared with 
similar ventures in the United States (as a rule made up of only a few private 
entrepreneurs in collaboration with financial institutions). The first investment 
fund was established by Nihon Godo Finance in 1982 (Kirihata 2010, p. 5). 
Significant progress has been made in legislation governing the 
functioning of enterprises. Representatives of companies investing high–risk 
capital had no rights to sit on the boards of subsidiary companies prior to 1995, 
limited liability companies were not allowed up to 1998, and there was also  
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a ban on investment in retirement funds. There was no use of stock options as an 
instrument motivating management staff, too. With the introduction of 
amendments to the Commercial Code in 1997, permission was granted for the 
use of stock options in the case of the management of new advanced technology 
companies. The following year saw the introduction of laws allowing the 
creation of limited liability companies in this field in order to attract funds from 
institutional investors. 
Successive solutions were passed in 2001. Up to that time a company was 
not allowed supplementary financing from the capital market from the start of 
the fiscal year of the planned public debut to the moment of actual registration 
(Yonekura and Lynskey 2003, p. 6). Moreover, all preferred stock as well as 
guaranteed and converted bonds had to have been transformed into stock 
(common stock) prior to the end of the fiscal year preceding going public. These 
requirements were executed even in situations where there was no certainty as to 
whether or not the IPO would actually take place. 
The year 2002 saw further modifications to the Commercial Code. 
Regulations restricting the operations of small emerging companies were 
changed. The minimum price rule for issued stock (JPY 50,000) was eliminated. 
A similar rule relating to the minimum stock price following a split was also 
stricken. These regulations greatly restricted the liquidity of companies 
undertaking high–risk investments. Other rules complicating mechanisms for 
capital market financing were also removed. Principle 4:1. is one such example. 
It insisted that in each and every case of a new issue of stock, the volume of 
common stock could not be greater than four times the volume of preferred 
stock. Moreover, the actual ratio had to receive approval by two–thirds of the 
stockholders. Also eliminated were “draconian”(Yonekura and Lynskey 2003,  
p. 8) restrictions tying the rights to stock options with preferred stock as well as 
guaranteed and converted bonds. 
5. Unsolved Problems 
Apart from the lowest indicator of GDP share in VC investments of all 
OECD countries (OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 2011)11 with a level of 
approximately 0.01%, among the most important unresolved matters is the 
already mentioned preference for incurring expenditures in the mature phase of 
the investment process. This is a characteristic quality of the activities of entities 
                                                 
11
 OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 2011, OECD Publishing, 2011, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-jpn-2-11-en, p. 93 (statistical data for Japan for 2006). 
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of the financial sector that minimize the period during which resources are 
frozen. 
Other authors (Mayer et al., 2005, p. 593) point to insufficient 
internationalization of VC investments in Japan. Out of the fifty–five examined 
funds, 44% only allocated their resources domestically, 13% in a single region 
of the country, 38% less than one–half of outlay abroad, and only 5% more than 
one–half. Apart from the domestic orientation of VC activities, the small number 
of ventures with the participation of foreign partners is a cause for concern. Such 
participation is certainly not fostered by the 20% tax on the profits of mixed–
capital limited liability hi–tech companies collected from foreign investors, 
introduced in 200712. 
The last phenomenon that must be noted is linked with what is known as 
the “grandstanding” effect. It was observed by Gompers (1966, pp. 17–53) and 
described in the case of Japan by three economists—Getsu, Uchida, and 
Matsumoto (2007). Pursuant to the “grandstanding” hypothesis, newly 
established high–risk capital companies that as yet have no standing on the 
market are enticed into going public too quickly in order to build a standing. The 
case of Japan confirms this hypothesis. This is especially true with respect to 
independent companies that have no capital ties with the institutions of the 
Japanese financial sector. 
An analysis conducted over the years 1986–2006 indicates that 
independent Japanese companies are listed on the stock exchange earlier and 
with lower share capital than other VC entities affiliated to the financial giants13. 
This tendency may be explained by the fact that, in contrast to their competitors, 
they do not have resources from a “mother” company or from the internal 
financial market of the given “keiretsu” industrial group. Lacking close ties with 
financial institutions, they must depend on external sources of additional capital. 
Moreover, it has been observed that independents, for the most part, make their 
debut on less rigorous markets—i.e. mainly MOTHERS (Market of the High–
growth and Emerging Stocks), the floor for advanced technology on the Tokyo 
stock exchange, and HERCULES that, up to 2010, served similar entities within 
a part of the securities exchange in Osaka. The rigors of the most important hi–
tech investment market—the JASDAQ securities exchange—are too difficult to 
meet in this case. 
The fate of the AIM (Alternate Investment Market) is interesting against 
this backdrop. This is a new high technology market that was established as  
                                                 
12
 Compare M. Corver, op. cit., p. 19. 
13
 Getsu S., Uchida K., and Matsumoto M., “The Dark Side of Independent Venture 
Capitalists: Evidence from Japan,” pp. 12–13, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928586 
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a “joint–venture” of the Tokyo and London stock exchanges in 2008. It was 
founded after the Japanese corruption scandals of the nineteen–nineties and the 
bank crisis of 2007. The new market was intended to be different from 
MOTHERS with its significantly stricter registration criteria. Required on this 
market are transparency, accounting in agreement with international standards, 
listings in the English language, and observance of the requirement for company 
results to be public and for strict control over “insider trading” (illegal benefits 
derived from access to information about a company prior to its public listing, 
for example). According to data from the close of 2011, only one company—i.e. 
Mebiopharm Co. Ltd.—entered this market! 
Significant underpricing of IPOs may be observed in the case of VC 
companies that are not linked to the financial sector14. To a great extent, this is 
the result of ex ante uncertainty with respect to the value of the company. It is a 
situation in which the price of company stock at the moment of its going public 
is lower than the market value because issuers are afraid of excessive risk. There 
is also a second aspect—long–term economic results. These also note 
significantly lower profits than in the case of companies acting in the name of 
financial giants (Wang, Wang and Lu 2003, pp. 2015-2034). Thus, both 
phenomena—the underpricing of stock prices in the IPO process and long–term 
results—seem to positively confirm the hypothesis of the “immaturity” of 
independent VC companies in Japan. 
6. Conclusions 
1.  The role of VC investment in Japan measured as the share of outlay in GDP 
is not large and Japan itself is in last position from among OECD countries 
in this respect. 
2.  Most investments in the advanced technology industries, apart from the 
financing system, are also dependent on other factors such as availability of 
investment projects, alternative sources for financing innovation, tax 
incentives, legal regulations, the degree to which innovative activities are 
conducted by major companies, and overall macro–economic conditions. 
                                                 
14
 Theories interpreting the phenomenon of IPO underpricing may be subdivided into those 
derived from the asymmetry of information (especially important in the hi–tech sphere), 
institutional, control, and behavioral. For example, Kirkulak et al. (2005, pp. 451–470) 
demonstrates that Japanese IPOs during the information technology (IT) boom of 1999 were 
significantly more underpriced than over other years. 
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3.  The low rate at which new companies are established in Japan as well as 
their relatively small size seem to be a reflection of problems with credit by 
small enterprises. It is for this reason that the development of VC financing 
is considered to be favorable for both already existing small innovative 
entities and new technological start–ups. 
4.  Investment allowances should be proposed more broadly in order to utilize 
the potential embedded in high–risk capital companies, and the creation of 
databases relating to achieved results with respect to already operating VC 
firms. The adding of intellectual property to the arsenal of security 
instruments also seems to be a good solution. 
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Streszczenie 
 
VENTURE CAPITAL W JAPONII JAKO INSTRUMENT FINANSOWEGO 
WSPARCIA INNOWACYJNOŚCI GOSPODARKI JAPOŃSKIEJ 
 
„Venture capital” (dosłownie kapitał wysokiego ryzyka) przeznaczony jest do 
finansowania małych firm, które same nie posiadają wystarczających zasobów, lecz ich 
działalność wskazuje na potencjalnie duże zyski w przyszłości. Szczególną rolę może on 
pełnić w rozwoju branż zaawansowanych technologicznie, a także we wzroście 
przedsiębiorczości, rozumianej jako gotowość do zakładania nowych firm („star-ups”). 
Dwa czynniki: pierwszy – stosunkowo mała liczba nowych firm, a także firm 
likwidowanych w skali roku („firm turnover”) w Japonii oraz drugi – niewielki prestiż, 
jakim cieszy się zawód przedsiębiorcy, nie sprzyjają dynamizacji omawianej formy 
finansowania przedsięwzięć. Cytowany wskaźnik, dla Japonii należy do najniższych 
 w porównaniu z innymi krajami wysoko rozwiniętymi (Grabowiecki 2000), zaś profesja 
przedsiębiorcy nie jest szczytem marzeń ludzi po studiach. Znacznie bardziej chcieliby 
oni swoją karierę zawodową realizować jako członkowie rządowej biurokracji lub 
pracownicy dużej korporacji (Corver 2008, s. 2). Ta świadomość ulega jednak 
stopniowej zmianie, chociażby dlatego, że wbrew popularnym przekonaniom, większość 
niewielkich przedsiębiorstw, powstaje nie w okresie prosperity, lecz pod koniec 
spadkowej fazy cyklu koniunkturalnego. Z taką fazą mamy do czynienia w Japonii od 
paru lat. Młodzi, kreatywni ludzie, rekrutujący się z bezrobotnych, poszukują 
samozatrudnienia, wykorzystują wszelakie szanse, tkwiące w „ruszającej na powrót” 
maszynerii gospodark (Yonekura, Lynskey 2003, s. 11). 
